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THE VIABILITY OF INTERSTATE
COLLABORATION IN THE ABSENCE OF
FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION
H. JOSEPH DRAPALSKI III*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Federal Government has declined to enact a
nationwide regulatory scheme to abate greenhouse gas emissions:
Congress has repeatedly failed to pass comprehensive legislation and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has only recently—and
reluctantly—begun to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. In the
absence of the guidance that might otherwise be afforded by a
centralized regulatory scheme, some states are now taking action to
collaborate on abatement efforts through regionally defined
interstate initiatives. While much scholarship analyzes these state-led
initiatives with the expectation that federal legislation will soon exist,
this analysis departs from that tradition. As it is increasingly unlikely
that federal action will occur in the foreseeable future, it is now
necessary to consider the long-term viability of these state-led
initiatives in the absence of comprehensive federal legislation. This
Note focuses upon two of the most pressing challenges which face the
regional initiatives: first, the inherently limited breadth of their
jurisdiction; second, the likelihood of survival in the face of potential
constitutional challenges.
This paper proceeds in three parts. Part I will first set the stage
for this analysis by showing that congressional legislation is not likely
to occur in the near future. Second, Part I will briefly describe the
regional initiatives as they stand today. The difficulties the regional
initiatives face in the absence of federal action will be considered in
Parts II and III. Part II explores the viability of the initiatives in light
of their limited jurisdiction. Part III, under the assumption that
Congress it not likely to pass comprehensive climate change
legislation in the near future, considers the constitutional concerns
that may threaten the regional initiatives.
* Duke University School of Law, J.D. & LL.M. expected 2012; Amherst College, B.A.,
magna cum laude, 2008.
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II. FEDERAL INACTION AND THE ADVENT OF REGIONAL
INITIATIVES
The United States Congress came deceptively close to taking
affirmative action to abate nationwide greenhouse gas emissions in
2009, but ultimately failed to pass the American Clean Energy and
1
Security Act (ACES) into law. Early signs were optimistic, however,
as ACES did pass through the House of Representatives, but the bill
fell flat when it failed to come to a vote in the Senate. Since the bill’s
failure, the political atmosphere surrounding federal climate change
action has become increasingly toxic. Due to the lack of action at the
federal level—and the improbability of such action occurring in the
near future—some states are now coordinating their own interstate
regulatory policies. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),
for example, is the most well-known and longest operating regional
initiative; a similar initiative has been developed on the West Coast.
Before delving into an analysis of the viability of such regional
initiatives, it first is necessary to discuss the circumstances that
catalyzed the creation of such interstate collaboration and the manner
in which they function.
A. The Fruitless Search for a Solution
With so much empirical and academic support in favor of a
2
federal cap-and-trade program, it must have seemed hardly a

1. The American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). The Bill
passed a vote by the Energy and Commerce Committee by a vote of 33 to 25 on May 21, 2009,
then also passed out of the House of Representatives, where it was introduced, by a vote of 219
to 212 on June 26, 2009.
2. JANET PEACE & ROBERT N. STAVINS, PEW CTR. FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, IN
BRIEF: MEANINGFUL AND COST EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY: THE CASE FOR CAP AND
TRADE 2 (2010) (defining the cap as an upper-limit on emissions determined by the regulatory
body overseeing the cap-and-trade regime, which then distributes a number of allowances equal
to this cap) [hereinafter MEANINGFUL AND COST EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY]. One of the
most successful experiences of the United States with a cap-and-trade program was with its Acid
Rain Program (ARP). The cap-and-trade portion of the ARP, which was enacted in 1995, has
accomplished a more than 40% reduction in the United States’ national sulfur dioxide
emissions. Sam Napolitano et al., The U.S. Acid Rain Program: Key Insights from the Design,
Operation, and Assessment of a Cap-and-Trade Program, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 47, 47 (2007)
(estimating that benefits from the ARP emission reductions are approximately $142 billion by
2010, with an annual compliance cost of $3.5 billion); see generally Jonathan B. Wiener & Barak
D. Richman, Mechanism Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC
LAW 363, 384, 386 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (finding that a capand-trade system is appealing because of its ability to minimize cost, allow for flexibility,
adaptability, and burden distribution); Jonathan B. Wiener, Property and Prices to Protect the
Planet, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 515, 519–21 (2009) (comparing the relative merits of a tax
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surprise for those attuned to the political winds in Washington when
ACES passed through the United States House of Representatives on
June 26, 2009. However, the bill’s passage was not assured: It passed
by a margin of only seven votes, 219 to 212, with forty-three
3
democrats voting against the bill. Although numerous cap-and-trade
bills were introduced prior to ACES, this vote marked the first time
that either house of Congress passed a bill which comprehensively
addressed many climate change inducing greenhouse gases. In
addition to implementing a nationwide cap-and-trade system, ACES
contained the sweeping provisions needed to make the U.S.
internationally competitive by encouraging the development and use
of renewable technologies while simultaneously decreasing domestic
4
greenhouse gas emissions.
5
Despite the overwhelming support it received from industry and
6
environmental organizations, and the tacit approval of politicians

or cap-and-trade solution, finding that while a tax removes uncertainty about price, it does not
definitively limit the amount of emissions, as opposed to a cap-and-trade system which leaves
some uncertainty about price, but does explicitly cap emissions).
3. Support for this bill was far from unanimous among Democrats in the House of
Representatives. In this era of partisan politics, Republican votes against the bill were to be
expected, but it did not bode well for the bill’s future that such a large contingent of Democratic
lawmakers also voted against it. H.R.2454 - American Clean Energy And Security Act of 2009,
OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/actions_votes (last visited Aug.
31, 2011) (reporting that only eight Republicans voted for the bill, while 169 voted against it,
and that 211 Democrats voted for the bill, while 43 voted against it).
4. While outside the purview of this paper, the potential panacea this bill promised for
the Nation’s climate concerns cannot be understood without brief mention of its energy designs.
The Committee on Energy and Commerce listed the following as the bill’s key provisions: a
requirement that electric utilities and the government must meet 20% of their electricity
demand through renewable energy by 2020; a multibillion dollar promise of investment in clean
energy technology and efficiency; new energy-saving standards for buildings and appliances; a
reduction in carbon emissions by 80% by 2050 over 2005 levels; and, despite these lofty, but
achievable goals, a guarantee that costs to the average household will not exceed 50 cents per
day. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND
SECURITY ACT (H.R. 2454) (2009), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/
Press_111/20090724/hr2454_housesummary.pdf.
5. Due to the dedicated and extensive negotiations of Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and
Graham, support for the bill was secured from a broad base of industry parties including
Exelon, General Electric, Dow Chemical Company, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and
Dupont. Hearing on The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 Before the
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of David G. Hawkins, Dir. Climate Programs, Nat’l Res. Def.
Council), available at http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/aces/files/glo_09042301.pdf (stating
that ACES is aligned with the interests of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership, of which these
companies are members); and closely fits its proposed ideal legislation); John M. Broder, House
Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/us/politics/27climate.html?_r=1&hp; Ryan Lizza, As the
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hailing from both sides of the aisle, the bill ultimately tumbled from
its pinnacle of assured success to the worn carpet of a smoke-filled
backroom. While a precise reason for the bill’s failure to reach a vote
in the Senate is subject to discussion, it is clear that internal politics
significantly contributed to its demise, as the bill became so
politicized that even the White House, under an administration which
8
repeatedly espoused its support for such an initiative, would not fight
9
for the bill’s passage.
Bearing in mind the failure of a bill which appeared so favorably
positioned to pass both chambers of the Congress, and the particular
circumstances which doomed it, the prospects for implementing a
federally mandated cap-and-trade regime in the near future to
10
combat climate change are dim. The failure of the federal
government to take action has left open a largely uncharted

World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/
101011fa_fact_lizza (noting that support could be found from the oil companies and the
Chamber of Commerce); Tony Kreindler, New Momentum to Pass a Carbon Cap in 2009,
CLIMATE 411 (May 21, 2009), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/2009/05/21/new-momentum-topass-a-carbon-cap-in-2009/ (noting that the U.S. Climate Action Partnership).
6. The majority of environmental groups supported a bill such as the ACES, something
for which they had fought for years, with some demanding even stauncher standards. Among
those who supported the bill were the Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Sierra Club, Audubon Society, The Nature Conservancy, Alliance for Climate
Protection, League of Conservation Voters, and Defenders of Wildlife. See supra note 5.
7. While Democratic support seemed predominately a given, the Republicans were far
from enthusiastic, and thus any support from their party was a huge boon for the bill. Kerry,
Lieberman, and Graham counted on support from a handful of Republicans: Susan Collins,
Olympia Snowe, Scott Brown, George LeMieux, and, of course, Lindsey Graham. Id. Although
even this small Republican support was promising, if the vote on the bill from the House was
any indicator, the Senators would need more votes than that to compensate for the number of
Democrats who might oppose it.
8. President Obama’s enthusiastic support for climate change legislation was a principal
pillar of his campaign in 2008. See Press Release, President Barak Obama, President-Elect
Obama Promises “New Chapter” on Climate Change (Nov. 18, 2008), available at
http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_obama_promises_new_chapter_on_climate_
change/.
9. The White House did not follow through on its earlier promises to push climate change
legislation through Congress, however, as it withheld its support from the Bill’s sponsors and
issued a damaging statement directly to Fox News labeling the bill a “gas tax.” Major Garrett,
WH Opposes Higher Gas Taxes Floated by S.C. GOP Sen. Graham in Emerging Senate Energy
Bill, FOX NEWS (Apr. 15, 2010), http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2010/04/15/wh-opposeshigher-gas-taxes-floated-sc-gop-sen-graham-emerging-senate-energy-bill.
10. The White House now entirely avoids the issue of cap-and-trade as a pariah and the
Republican Party regularly uses the so called “cap-and-tax” as a symbol to disparage any
climate action effort. See John M. Broder, ‘Cap and Trade’ Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy
of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/science/
earth/26climate.html.
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regulatory space for state collaborations to take the lead in the fight
to abate greenhouse gas emissions. Due to their limited impact,
regional responses are not the optimal solution, and the threats to
their successful implementation are many. However, in light of the
present circumstances, an analysis of the continued viability of
subnational action is warranted.
B. Regional Initiatives: Coordinated State Action to Abate Greenhouse
Gas Emissions
One alternative to federal action lies in the concerted effort of a
11
number of states to take coordinated action. Interest in the potential
of such regional initiatives to fill this unoccupied regulatory space is
growing, but these efforts face many debilitating problems that will
take considerable effort to overcome.
1. A Subnational Response to Abate Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
Given the threatening political waters of Congress and resulting
inactivity, regional initiatives have become an attractive option for
states. While such an approach may seem to be a novel reaction to the
failure of ACES, the first such program, the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI), began operation over five years ago. Two
other regional initiatives are currently in varying stages of
development: the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), slated to become
operational on the West Coast in 2012, and the Midwestern
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (the Midwestern Accord).
It is argued that the driving force behind a regional approach, as
opposed to a single state taking action on its own, is cost
12
effectiveness. Regional actions may be lucrative as they allow states
to pool their resources and realize a much more significant abatement
of emissions than any one state could hope to accomplish on its own.
While the promise of such rewards is alluring, it is by no means
13
guaranteed; in fact, some scholars might take the opposite position.

11. Any discussion of regional initiatives in this paper refers solely to their provisions
regarding the implementation and administration of a cap-and-trade program. Although the
initiatives also enact various other standards or mechanisms, they are outside the purview of this
discussion.
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate
Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1965–66 (2007) [hereinafter Think Globally] (arguing that
subnational action is both inherently inadequate to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and
inefficient because of economic considerations (e.g., leakage and free-riding)). The problems
which face a subnational response are many, and these difficulties are addressed and considered
at length in Part III, infra.
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2. The Regional Initiatives. RGGI is comprised of ten Mid14
Atlantic and New England States, all of which agreed to the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Memorandum of Understanding
15
(MOU) by the year 2007. Functionally, RGGI is a market-based
emissions trading program that distributes allowances and
administers the trade in carbon dioxide emissions allowances from
fossil fuel-fired power plants of twenty-five megawatts (MW) capacity
16
or greater. RGGI establishes a regional cap on carbon dioxide
17
emissions and requires regulated power plants—209 region-wide—to
18
possess an allowance for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted. A
critical note about RGGI is that it does not bind any state to follow its
model rule. RGGI publishes a model rule, and the decision of the
member states to adopt a similar rule occurs through their respective
state legislatures.
As its name suggests, the Western Climate Initiative is a West
Coast-based regional initiative, but it has an increasingly international
purview. The Initiative’s membership presently consists of seven
19
states and four Canadian provinces. The international ambitions of

14. The ten states which participate in RGGI are Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts,
Maryland, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. REG’L
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET: THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE,
available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Fact_Sheet.pdf. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Maryland which joined in 2007, were the only states not to join earlier with the drafting of the
Model Rule. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/rggi (last visited Aug. 31, 2011).
15. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2005)
[hereinafter RGGI MOU], available at http://rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf.
16. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, OVERVIEW OF RGGI CO2 BUDGET TRADING
PROGRAM (2007) [hereinafter RGGI OVERVIEW], available at http://rggi.org/docs/
program_summary_10_07.pdf.
17. The RGGI cap is currently projected out to 2018. From 2009 to 2014, the cap is 188
million tons of CO2 emissions per year, which will decline by 2.5 percent a year beginning in
2015. This plan will realize a total reduction of 10 percent by 2018. Id. at 2.
18. RGGI allowances are auctioned quarterly and may also be obtained through
secondary markets, the Chicago Climate Futures Exchange (CCFE), or Green Exchange.
RGGI uses the majority of the proceeds of these auctions to invest in consumer benefit
programs such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, direct energy bill assistance, and other
programs to reduce greenhouse gases. Id. at 4–6.
19. A Partner to the WCI is a state or province which commits to participate fully in the
program’s cap-and-trade and reduction commitments. The seven states which are active
partners in the WCI are Arizona, California, New Mexico, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington. The four Canadian provinces are British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and
Quebec. WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DETAILED DESIGN § 1.1 (2010) [hereinafter WCI
DETAILED
DESIGN],
available
at
http://westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/general/program-design/DetailedDesign/.
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this program, which extends into both Canada and Mexico, is not
20
matched by any other regional initiative. While the WCI’s cap-andtrade mechanism is not yet operational, it is scheduled to become
21
active in 2012; its allowance auction will occur in a nearly identical
22
manner to RGGI. The scope of its emissions cap is comparatively
massive—it covers nearly ninety percent of economy-wide emissions
23
of the states within the WCI’s jurisdiction. The Initiative will grow
substantially in 2015, when the WCI’s jurisdiction will expand to
24
cover “any fuel supplier” that distributes “any fossil fuel sold or
imported for consumption” that emits 25,000 tons or more of CO2
25
equivalent when combusted. The WCI is designed to achieve a
fifteen percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions beneath the
26
2005 baseline year by 2020.
The Midwestern Accord is still in its introductory planning
stages, given that its Advisory Group just announced their
27
28
recommendations and model rule in May 2010. Six of the

20. In addition to the states and provinces which are partners to the WCI, there are also
numerous members which have not made a full commitment and are thus considered observers.
The observer states from the United States are Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, and
Wyoming. The observer provinces from Canada are Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, and Yukon.
The observer states from Mexico are Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon,
Sonora, and Tamaulipas. THE WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN FOR THE WCI
REGIONAL PROGRAM: DESIGN SUMMARY 3 (2010) [hereinafter WCI DESIGN SUMMARY],
available at http://westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/func-startdown/281/.
21. The cap-and-trade program will begin in 2012 regulating generators and industrial
sources, then expand in 2015 to include providers of transportation fuels and residential and
commercial fuels. Id. at 8–10.
22. WCI DETAILED DESIGN, supra note 19, § 6; WCI DESIGN SUMMARY, supra note 20,
at 18–19.
23. Compare WCI DESIGN SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 5 (embracing a broad scope that is
“economy-wide” in order to achieve the “most cost-effective reduction opportunities”), with
RGGI OVERVIEW, supra note 16, at 2 (mandating that RGGI will regulate only “fossil fuelfired electric generating units serving a generator of 25 MW or larger” and that any source
which commenced operation prior to 2005 must use fossil fuels for more than 50% of its heat
output to qualify).
24. WCI DETAILED DESIGN, supra note 19, § 3.2.3 (including under the umbrella of fuel
suppliers any distributors of liquid transportation fuels, petroleum coke, natural gas, propane,
heating fuel, or “any other fossil fuel sold or imported for consumption”).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 5.2.4.2.
27. MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION ACCORD, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE ADVISORY GROUP (2010) [hereinafter ACCORD RECOMMENDATIONS], available at
http://www.seventhgenerationadvisors.org/images/stories/pdfs/accord_final_recommendations.p
df.

Drapalski_122211 (Do Not Delete)

476

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

12/22/2011 12:56 PM

[Vol. 21:469

Initiative’s seven member states are of the United States: Iowa,
Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin; the other,
29
Manitoba, is a Canadian province. Not included in its count of seven
member states are its four observer states; that is to say, states
30
without full voting participation. The Midwest Accord’s cap-andtrade program sets 2005 as its baseline year and sets the cap at twenty
percent below this level by December 31, 2020 and eighty percent
31
below this level by December 31, 2050. Assuming that the Initiative
follows the Advisory Group’s recommendations, its program will
include all sources which emit over 25,000 metric tons of CO2
equivalent within the following sectors: electricity generation,
industrial combustion sources, industrial process sources, fuels
serving residential, commercial, industrial buildings, or transportation
fuels; there is exception for biomass, biofuels and biogenic
32
emissions.
Although the magnitude of greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States is too large for any state to handle on its own, collective
action amongst the regional initiatives has the potential to yield
meaningful reductions and set the stage for future national-level
cooperation. While some of the regional initiatives make no secret of
33
34
35
their preference for national action, the Midwest Accord, WCI,

28. MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION ACCORD, FINAL MODEL RULE FOR
MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION ACCORD (2010) [hereinafter ACCORD
MODEL RULE], available at http://www.igreenlaw.com/storage/Final_Model_Rule1.pdf.
29. A state is a participating jurisdiction to the Midwestern Accord if it signed the
Midwestern Accord’s Memorandum of Understanding. Id. § XX-1.2(bh). On November 15,
2007, the governors of Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Manitoba, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin
signed a Memorandum of Understanding and entered the Midwestern Accord. ACCORD
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 27, at 2.
30. The Midwestern Accord’s Observer States are Indiana, Ohio, Ontario, and South
Dakota. Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/mggra (last visited Aug.
31, 2011) (listing the partner jurisdictions and observer states (which are not included in either
the Model Rule or Advisory Recommendations documents)).
31. ACCORD MODEL RULE, supra note 28, § XX-1.1. Additionally, the cap-and-trade
program is to begin on “January 1 of the first calendar year that is at least 12 months after the
adoption of the model rule and execution of an implementing memorandum of understanding
by the participating jurisdictions.” Id.
32. Id. § XX-1.4.
33. See, e.g., ACCORD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 27, at 3 (stating that all member
states and Canadian provinces “strongly prefer the implementation of an effective cap-andtrade program at the federal level in both countries, rather than a regional program”).
34. The Accord makes quite clear its intention to pursue linkage in its design principles
which state that it must “[e]nable linkage to systems in other jurisdictions with similarly rigorous
THE
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36

and RGGI all recognize that collective action is possible, although
not guaranteed, and may serve as a vehicle for more widespread
greenhouse gas emissions abatement.
III. THE CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY LIMITED JURISDICTION
While the desire and ability to link the initiatives is critical to a
successful future effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States, the regional initiatives also will be required to navigate
numerous obstacles. The most immediate and glaring problem is,
quite simply, their limited jurisdiction: An individual initiative’s
ability to put a dent in nationwide greenhouse gas emissions is
37
limited, and, even if they were to combine the entirety of their
membership, the initiatives could not compel non-participating states
to abide by emission abatement goals. As is true in the global context,
and as applies here by analogy, any abatement action, both with
regard to its enforceability and its effectiveness, will require the
38
broadest possible cooperation.
The extent of the initiatives’ jurisdiction is one of the most
determinative elements of their ability to mitigate the deleterious
39
40
effect of the two most critical threats: free riders and leakage.
Employing asymmetrical regulation to reduce greenhouse gases will
inevitably lead some states to take little or no action of their own.
These non-participating states will recognize that there is little

accounting in order to create economies of scale and to increase market efficiencies, diversity,
and liquidity, while reducing costs.” Id. at 4.
35. Of all three initiatives, WCI is by far the most adamant on the subject of linkage. It
includes both a detailed provision to allow for linkage in its Detailed Design, see WCI
DETAILED DESIGN, supra note 19, § 9, and reiterates its “commitment to promote[] broad
collaborative action to reduce GHG emissions” in its design summary. WCI DESIGN SUMMARY,
supra note 20, at 22.
36. RGGI’s Model Rule includes an elaborate provision to incorporate an offset
mechanism into the program. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MODEL RULE 83–135
(2007),
http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.31.08.pdf
[hereinafter
RGGI MODEL RULE]. Additionally, RGGI has reportedly even held informal talks with the EU
ETS on the potential for linkage. See Saeed Shah, U.S. States Defy Bush Over Greenhouse
Gases, THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Nov. 12, 2004, at 30.
37. Think Globally, supra note 13, at 1965–66.
38. Id. Professor Wiener makes this argument in the context of international climate
change law, but states that it is even more powerful, “a fortiori,” made in the case of the United
States. It is entirely relevant by analogy here, as the individual states of the United States are
equally powerless to combat climate change when viewed in light of the aggregate emissions of
the United States as a whole—not to mention the world.
39. See infra Part II.B.1.
40. See infra Part II.B.2.
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economic incentive for them to act when other states, of their own
volition, will take action and incur the related expenses—thus the free
rider. Additionally, as regulatory standards for greenhouse gas
reductions develop and become more stringent, it may become
economically viable for sources and industry to relocate their sources
of energy from those states that participate in the initiatives to those
41
that do not—leakage. Both problems threaten to undermine the
efficacy of a program that is not of a national scope, underscoring the
necessity for collaboration.
A. The Benefits of Collaboration
All three initiatives have the regulatory power to mandate
greenhouse gas emissions abatement within their jurisdictions, but
their long-term viability could be greatly enhanced if they coordinate
42
their efforts. There is little question that encompassing a greater
43
diversity of sources will foster a more robust market for allowances.
Including more sources in the market will increase flexibility and
minimize costs by enabling firms to find the lowest cost methods and
44
locations of abatement. Additionally, as the defeat of ACES
revealed, the initiatives will face adamant opposition from industry
and hostile political forces; therefore collaboration is critical, as
political capital pooled by a larger community of states would have
45
greater potential to overcome such opposition. Aside from
increasing the likelihood of initiative survival, a larger collaboration

41. The form of economic leakage discussed here also has evident corollary implications
for the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions. While a state or initiative’s emissions may
decrease as sources reallocate their production or relocate their facilities, net emissions will not
actually be curbed—the same amount of carbon is still being released into the atmosphere.
Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach,
14 N.Y.U. ENVT’L. L.J. 54, 75–78 (2005).
42. See W. COAST GOVERNOR’S GLOBAL WARMING INITIATIVE, STAFF
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNORS (2004), available at http://www.ef.org/
westcoastclimate/WCGGWI_Nov_04%20Report.pdf (finding that it would be more efficient
and effective to act on a regional level and to learn from RGGI’s experience creating a regional
collaboration); see also Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Governor George Pataki, Governor
Calls on Northeast States to Fight Climate Change (Apr. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/03/april25_2_03.htm.
43. See Wiener, supra note 2, at 519 (“[A] broader and thicker market enhances the costeffectiveness of trading by engaging lower-cost abatement opportunities. Extending the cap and
trade market to include all sectors of the economy [and additional states] will further ensure
cost-effectiveness.”).
44. Id.
45. For a brief overview of the political battle that doomed ACES, see supra notes 14–22
and accompanying text.
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of states might also facilitate the transfer of technology and ideas,
while enhancing the competitiveness and cost-efficiency of abating
46
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.
There are strong signals that coordination between the regional
initiatives will continue to grow. First, both WCI and the Midwest
Accord appear to have integrated a number of the lessons learned
from RGGI, the first initiative of this type, into their own regulatory
frameworks. This influence is well documented in the WCI and the
Midwest Accord’s regulatory designs and is made explicitly clear in
47
some of their founding documents. Most importantly, the shared
characteristics of the initiatives’ cap-and-trade programs could greatly
ease a future integration, especially because their procedural and
functional similarities will facilitate the registration, tracking, and
trade of allowances across the initiatives. Second, in May 2010 the
three initiatives joined their resources to create the Three-Regions
Offsets Working Group, which released a white paper on how best to
design and implement an interregional program to ensure the quality
48
of offsets.
This action is significant because it signals that the
initiatives share a “common vision” and may work towards a
mechanism that will allow parties in any initiative to develop
49
interchangeable offset projects in another initiative’s jurisdiction.

46. After all, the initiatives would unite not only twenty-three American states, but also
several Canadian provinces and, potentially, even a few Mexican states. Two of the United
States’ and the world’s largest economies are leading members of the initiatives, California and
New York City. California is the eighth largest economy in the world, with a gross domestic
product (GDP) of $1.83 trillion, which constitutes 13% of the entire GDP of the United States.
See Gross Domestic Product By State, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/ (choose “California” for the “state” tab, then
choose appropriate tabs to find data) (last visited Dec. 12, 2010). New York has a GDP of $1.1
trillion, and, if it were a nation, it would rank as the 16th largest GDP in the world. See id.
(choose “New York” for the “state” tab, then choose appropriate tabs to find data). Combined,
California and New York have an annual GDP of $2.93 trillion.
47. In its design summary, WCI specifically analyzes RGGI’s use of auctions to distribute
its allowances and adopts a similar quarterly auction system. WCI DESIGN SUMMARY, supra
note 20, at 18.
48. THREE-REGIONS OFFSETS WORKING GROUP, ENSURING OFFSET QUALITY: DESIGN
AND IMPLEMENTATION CRITERIA FOR A HIGH-QUALITY OFFSET PROGRAM (2010),
http://www.rggi.org/docs/3_Regions_Offsets_Announcement_05_17_10.pdf.
49. Id. An offset project is a mechanism incorporated into all three initiatives’ programs
which reduce compliance costs and increase compliance flexibility for sources by allowing them
to literally offset their own emissions requirements by sponsoring projects to reduce or
sequester emissions in another sector outside those regulated by the cap-and-trade program to
which they belong. Given the inherently extra-jurisdictional nature of the mechanism, a
legitimate, accurate, and comprehensive reporting system must be implemented by all three
initiatives to ensure its functioning. Due to the necessary stringency of this inter-regional
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B. The Shortcomings of Limited Collaboration
Collaboration not only provides benefits for the regional
initiatives; it is necessary to ensure their long-term viability.
Unfortunately, there are daunting challenges that threaten
subnational action due to limitations on the reach of their jurisdiction
and concerns about federalism.
1. Leakage. The United States’ market is a highly integrated,
open network for trade in and among the states. While the exchange
of domestic goods with as little restriction as possible is positive in
many circumstances, this lack of constraint makes any regional
initiative’s effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions exponentially
more difficult. With fewer barriers to the flow of goods, energy, and
services, it is easier for energy producers and industry users to
reallocate their production and distribution, or to relocate their
50
facilities.
This open market creates particular difficulties for the regional
initiatives because the ease of leakage also encourages free-riding.
Power plants and other sources regulated under the regional
initiatives that are located outside of the initiatives’ jurisdictions incur
no expense from the initiatives and may distribute their products to
states within the jurisdiction of the initiatives at no additional
expense. To restrict them would violate the free flow of interstate
51
commerce. As a result, states that do not join the regional initiatives
stand to benefit from increased demand for their products without
submitting themselves to more stringent emissions standards. Thus,
states are indirectly encouraged to free-ride for two reasons: first,
their domestic industries will remain independent of any regulatory
standard promulgated by the regional initiative, and second, domestic
industries may also enjoy increased demand for their products as a
result of the additional constraints imposed on initiative member
states.

reporting component, it is unavoidable that the growth of an offset program should thereby
foster collaboration and interdependence amongst the initiatives.
50. It is unlikely that the initiatives or their member states could enact similar barriers, as
such state action would almost certainly come into conflict with the Dormant Commerce
Clause, which prohibits a state from discriminating against commerce from another state. See
Engel, supra note 41; Think Globally, supra note 13, at 1969–70.
51. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (concluding that any state action
that the Court finds improperly discriminates against or burdens interstate commerce is
unconstitutional).
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This problem is further complicated due to the use of massive
shared interstate electrical grids in the United States. These grids
make it possible for energy production to shift “immediately and
52
seamlessly,” albeit not over long distances; thus, if the price of
energy production in one state or region increases, it is practically
effortless for a neighboring state outside of the initiative’s jurisdiction
to increase its own production in response. The deleterious
ramifications of such a relationship for greenhouse gas abatement are
not mere speculation—this form of leakage is believed to be the
53
driver behind RGGI’s enormous leakage rates —and should be an
enormous motivator for inter-initiative cooperation.
2. The Free-Rider. So long as participation in the initiatives is
voluntary, and there is no reason to believe that it will ever be
54
anything other than voluntary, states that do not participate will
benefit from the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions achieved by
55
those states that do participate. In other words, the states that act to
reduce their emissions cannot realize the full return on their
investment because they cannot entirely internalize the benefits of
56
their effort. The burden of the states that free ride will fall on those
57
states that take action to reduce their emissions. At its core, this is a
collective action problem: there is little, if any, incentive for a state
which does not fall under the jurisdiction of the initiatives or which
58
will not benefit from those advantages conferred by the initiatives to
acquiesce to more stringent emissions standards. This problem is
particularly poignant in light of the competitive advantage previously
considered in the discussion of leakage.
3. Industrial Flight. As inevitable as the phenomenon of the free
rider is, so too is that of industrial flight: As the price of doing
52. Think Globally, supra note 13, at 1969.
53. The Magnificent Seven: States Take the Lead on Global Warming, AM. COUNCIL FOR
AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. (Jan.
16, 2006, 8:00 PM), http://www.aceee.org/
blog/2006/01/magnificent-seven-states-take-lead-global-warming (estimating that RGGI’s rate
of leakage falls between 60% and 90%).
54. See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion on the constitutional limitations of the regional
initiatives.
55. See Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National
Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 318 (1997) (arguing, by
analogy for the action of a subnational polity, that free-riding is an inescapable phenomenon so
long as a state acts unilaterally or membership in a collective initiative is voluntary).
56. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1516–21 (2007).
57. Think Globally, supra note 13, at 1965.
58. See infra II.B.1.
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business in a state which is party to the initiatives increases—or at
minimum oscillates due to the effect of new emissions standards—
some sources will reallocate their resources or relocate their
59
operations to non-member states. This multifaceted problem may be
understood as the embodiment of two interrelated phenomena: the
60
price effect and relocation effect.
The price effect is the initial and direct response to the change in
cost that will inevitably occur when a state adopts new, more stringent
61
emissions standards. As the cost to produce emissions-intensive
goods rises within a given initiative’s jurisdiction, producers within
this jurisdiction will raise the price of the good and reduce the
quantity that they produce. In reaction to this change, producers of
the same good located in a non-member state will benefit because
their costs to produce the good will not rise and as a result, they will
62
be able to increase their production and profit.
The relocation of a source’s facilities should only take place if an
initiative’s restrictions on emissions become so stringent that it would
be more cost effective for a business to move its entire operation to
63
another location outside the initiative’s jurisdiction. The extent of
this phenomenon will depend upon the cost-benefit analysis
undertaken by firms that fall under the jurisdiction of an initiative,
and will consider the costs of moving their operation against the
expense of complying with the more stringent local regulation.

59. Stavins, supra note 55. It bears mentioning that these dangers are purely economic
arguments; many other factors may also come into play that might influence a firm’s decision to
move its operations.
60. Cf. Think Globally, supra note 13, at 1967–68 (arguing, in a global context, that there is
an additional factor: the “slack off” effect which theorizes that one country may decrease its
abatement if it is abating up to the point at which its global marginal benefits equal its domestic
marginal costs and another country then abates beyond its own such equilibrium point, but this
is not incorporated into the argument of the paper, as such a relationship seems inapplicable for
an analysis of the behavior of sources in the United States).
61. Id.
62. Id. The price effect will occur soon after the implementation of new greenhouse gas
emission standards by an initiative, and it will not lead to immediate industry relocation. Id.
However, in the longer term, the price effect will also likely influence the type of businesses that
operate in a given initiative, as it may foster the growth of one industry while increasing the
operating costs of another. Id.
63. Id.
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY OF REGIONAL, INTERSTATE
COLLABORATION TO ABATE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
With little hope of comprehensive greenhouse gas legislation on
the horizon, the concerns previously discussed have proven
insufficient to deter the states from taking action of their own. As
states continue to take action and interstate cooperation continues to
spread, the long-term viability of these efforts will increasingly
depend not only upon their economic success, but their ability to
survive constitutional challenges within the nation’s courts.
The constitutionality of subnational environmental regional
initiatives has been considered in previous scholarship, but many of
these analyses rest on the flawed assumption that comprehensive
federal legislation will be forthcoming—this paper departs from that
tradition to present a pragmatic evaluation of the initiatives’
constitutionality as they exist today. Congress has declined to pass
comprehensive legislation that will regulate nationwide greenhouse
gas emissions abatement; it is unlikely that it will do so in the
foreseeable future. This neglected dynamic should play a pivotal role
in any analysis of the regional initiatives’ ability to survive
constitutional attacks under preemption doctrine, the Dormant
Commerce Clause, and the Compacts Clause.
A. In the Absence of Federal Legislation
1. The Compact Clause. The first constitutional question likely to
arise is whether collaboration between states is even constitutionally
permitted. Indeed, a purely textualist reading of Article I, Section
10—commonly known as the Compact Clause—would lead one to
64
believe that regional initiatives are not allowed by the Constitution.
The language of the Compact Clause appears damning for the
regional initiatives, as it clearly proclaims that “[n]o State shall,
without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or
65
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.” At firstglance, this seems to preclude even the existing initiatives because the
permission of Congress has been neither granted nor requested. This
immediately glaring conflict, however, should not be a problem, as
this language was substantially mitigated by the Supreme Court’s
66
1893 decision in Virginia v. Tennessee. In that decision, the Supreme

64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
66. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
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Court found that an agreement between two states in litigation over a
boundary dispute was constitutional under the Compact Clause
67
despite the absence of an explicit grant of congressional consent.
Instead, the decision held that “[t]he constitution does not state when
the consent of congress shall be given, whether it shall precede or
may follow the compact made, or whether it shall be express or may
68
be implied,” and, therefore, that the approval of Congress could be
69
“fairly implied from its subsequent legislation and proceedings.”
Here, it is very likely that Congressional approval is fairly
implied. First, it would not have been necessary for Congress to grant
its consent at the inception of the regional initiatives, as this could
70
“precede” or “follow the compact made.” Second, the question of
whether Congress has in fact explicitly granted its consent is far from
dispositive, as it might be “express” or “implied.” Given that
Congress has thus far chosen not to take action to prevent, displace,
or limit the development of the regional initiatives, it seems there is a
fair body of evidence to argue that Congress has impliedly granted its
consent.
There is an important qualification to the Court’s application of
the Compact Clause, however, which is that “the prohibition [on
compacts between states] is directed to the formation of any
combination tending to the increase of political power in the states,
which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the
71
United States.” Thus, with language reminiscent of the preemption
72
73
doctrine under the Supremacy Clause, the Court does have the
authority to strike down interstate agreements that have not received
a grant from Congress and threaten to “encroach upon” its “just
74
supremacy.” However, the Supreme Court limited the scope of such
a challenge under the Compact Clause in its 1978 decision of U.S.
75
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission. In U.S. Steel Corp., the
Court found that the Constitution permitted a multistate tax policy
67. Id. at 519.
68. Id. at 522.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 519.
72. See infra Part B, for a discussion on the preemption doctrine and its pertinence to the
regional initiatives.
73. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1, cl. 2. For a discussion of the Supremacy Clause, see infra n. 96
and accompanying text.
74. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519.
75. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
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agreement that was formed without an express grant of Congressional
76
consent. The Court distinguished between an interstate agreement
that would set the tax policy of the member states and one that
merely establishes a model rule and expects member states to
77
replicate it through their own legislatures. Therefore, even if a group
of states come together and set a model regulatory agenda, so long as
each state implements its own policy independently, the Compact
Clause will not render it unconstitutional.
This nuance bodes well for the survival of the regional initiatives
in the face of a Compact Clause challenge today. However, the threat
of such a challenge remains strong enough that the regional initiatives
operate as voluntary associations of states with no power to mandate
rules to their members. This is likely why RGGI does not impose
uniform policies on its members; instead, RGGI adopts model rules—
essentially framework regulatory policies—which the member states
are theoretically free to interpret and adopt through their own state
legislative system. While it may seem that a prisoner’s dilemma of
sorts might arise out of this situation—meaning here that states might
act to expand the initiatives to bind other states to stringent
regulations while failing to comply themselves—such a problem has
not occurred with the RGGI member states. It is too early to state
definitively, however, that the limitations imposed by the Compact
Clause will not become a larger problem in the future. As the
regional initiatives’ membership grows to include more states, each
with its own disparate interests, the need for more stringent,
compulsory regulation may become increasingly necessary. As the
initiatives stand today, however, and so long as the states remain
cognizant of their constitutionally mandated design limitations, it
seems unlikely that a constitutional challenge under the Compact
Clause could succeed against the initiatives in their current form.
2. The Dormant Commerce Clause. The difficulty created by the
absence of trade barriers and free exchange of goods in the United
States is further complicated by the limitations placed upon the states
to take action to correct for the price irregularity created by their
membership in a regional initiative. If, for example, RGGI’s member

76. Id. at 479.
77. Id. at 497 (“Even if appellants’ factual allegations were supported by the record, they
would be irrelevant to the facial validity of the Compact. As we have noted above, it is only the
individual State, not the Commission, that has the power to issue an assessment—whether
arbitrary or not. If the assessment violates state law, we must assume that state remedies are
available.”)
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states, or even RGGI itself, had the ability to place a tax on energy
imports into their jurisdiction or, conversely, give an advantage to the
utilities that produce energy within their jurisdiction, then they could
compensate for the disparity in price created by their more stringent
emissions standards. Unfortunately, the states are not entirely free to
take such action due to the jurisprudence surrounding the Dormant
Commerce Clause. As the following discussion will show, however, it
is premature to conclude that the Dormant Commerce Clause
precludes interstate climate change action.
a. Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence.
The Dormant Commerce Clause is a judicial doctrine derived by
the Supreme Court from Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
Constitution, which grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
78
with the Indian tribes.” This enumerated power of Congress,
commonly called the Commerce Clause, has been interpreted by the
judicial branch to create a negative power—the Dormant Commerce
79
Clause —which authorizes the federal courts to strike down as
unconstitutional any state regulation that improperly burdens or
discriminates against interstate commerce. Generally speaking,
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be grouped into two
broad categories: state statutes that facially discriminate against
interstate commerce—and are therefore nearly always per se
unconstitutional—and state statutes that are not found
discriminatory, but that are subject to a balancing test originating
80
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. that
weighs the state’s purpose and local benefits against the burden
placed on interstate commerce.
A state statute is facially discriminatory if it disadvantages outof-state interests, or favors in-state interests over out-of-state
81
interests. For this reason, state regulations passed merely for the
82
sake of economic protectionism are virtually always per se invalid.

78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
79. For the origins of the Dormant Commerce Clause, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(1824). An analysis of the sordid history of the Dormant Commerce Clause is unnecessary for
the purposes of this paper, as the holding case law at present will determine the outcome of a
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge against local climate change legislation.
80. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
81. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
82. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).

Drapalski_122211 (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2011]

THE VIABILITY OF INTERSTATE COLLABORATION

12/22/2011 12:56 PM

487

This would be the case, for example, if a state were to pass a law that
prohibits the import of energy from another state without any
semblance of justification. This is not always the case, however; the
83
Supreme Court ruled in Maine v. Taylor that state legislation can be
exempt in certain exceptional circumstances if it is passed to
accomplish a “legitimate local purpose” that “could not be served as
84
well by available nondiscriminatory means.” If the court finds that
the law in question is nondiscriminatory on its face, but might still
85
have impact—or, in other words, an “incidental effect” —on
interstate commerce, then it applies the Pike balancing test that
weighs the in-state benefits it produces against its burden on
86
interstate commerce. The weight placed upon the in-state benefits
produced by a state statute—and, in particular, on the type of in-state
benefits produced—has enormous implications for the likelihood of
survival of a state statute passed to comply with an interstate
environmental initiative.
b. Implications for Regional Climate Initiatives.
The threat of a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge does limit
the ability of states to pass legislation that might most expediently
ensure the success of the regional initiatives, but it does not entirely
preclude such action. For example, a statute passed by RGGI
member states that prohibits energy imports from non-RGGI states
would likely be found discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional
under the Dormant Commerce Clause—assuming here, for the sake
of argument that it would not fit into the atypical Maine exception
87
mold. The states are clearly precluded from passing any blanket
legislation that facially discriminates against out-of-state commerce,
but, so long as state legislators draft the language of their bills
carefully, states should be able to avoid passing statutes that are
clearly discriminatory and per se unconstitutional under the Dormant
Commerce Clause. While this complicates matters somewhat, it does
not render local climate legislation moot. It does mean that the RGGI
member states cannot pass individual laws that prohibit energy

83. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
84. Id. at 138.
85. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
86. Id.
87. Maine, 477 U.S. at 151–52 (finding that Maine’s ban on the importation of baitfish is
clearly discriminatory but justified by the legitimate local purpose of the state to “protect the
health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources”).
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imports from non-RGGI states. This would certainly be the easiest
route to account for the ease with which firms in RGGI states
circumvent RGGI’s regulations, but it is by no means the only
approach.
Instead, states should pass legislation that is optimally designed
to survive a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge under the Pike
balancing test and its progeny. The Pike test holds that a state
88
regulation passed “evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate purpose”
will only be struck down under the Dormant Commerce Clause if the
burden it imposes on interstate commerce is “clearly excessive in
89
relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike places great importance
upon the type of benefit produced by the state regulation: “the nature
of the local interest involved” will determine the “extent of the
90
burden [on interstate commerce] that will be tolerated.”
The distinction between the types of benefits produced by
regulations that place a burden on interstate commerce is critical due
to the added legitimacy and authority of state exercises of the police
power. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized
that benefits to the environment are an important public benefit
91
bestowed by the states upon their citizens. First, the Supreme Court
recognized the value of environmental benefits in its decision in
Maine when it held that a state “retains broad regulatory authority to
protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its
92
natural resources” so long as it does not “needlessly obstruct
interstate trade or attempt to ‘place itself in a position of economic
93
isolation.’” Then, in its 2007 decision in United Haulers Ass’n v.
94
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management, the Supreme Court held
that a city ordinance requiring local waste haulers to bring their waste
to a facility owned by the city was permissible in part because it
“confer[red] significant health and environmental benefits upon the
citizens of the Counties. . . .[and] [f]or these reasons, any arguable

88. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330 (2007).
92. Maine, 477 U.S. at 151 (emphasis added).
93. Id.
94. 550 U.S. at 330.
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burden the ordinances impose on interstate commerce does not
95
exceed their public benefits.”
Under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, benefits to the
state and its citizens’ health, welfare, and environment outweigh
96
those that are purely pecuniary. The states have a substantial
interest in preserving the health and welfare of their citizenry; this
might especially be true in the case of environmental harms found to
97
be a “threat to the public health and welfare.” In other words, while
a benefit such as “revenue generation is not a local interest that can
98
justify discrimination against interstate commerce,” environmental
benefits should be grouped into the category of a “reasonable basis
for legislation to protect the social . . . welfare of a community” for
which it is not the decision of the court to “deny the exercise locally
99
of [a state’s] sovereign power.”
Here, state statutes passed as part of an interstate environmental
collaboration are therefore predisposed to survive a Dormant
Commerce Clause challenge given that there is a clear local interest at
stake, with tangible benefits produced, for a purpose that the Court
has previously recognized. The states have a substantial interest in
preserving the health and welfare of their citizenry, and this remains
true for greenhouse gas emissions—a phenomenon that EPA has
100
previously found to be a “threat to the public health and welfare.”
In sum, not only do the states have a recognized interest under the
Pike test in taking action to mitigate a recognized threat to their local
population when the federal government has declined to do so, but

95. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added).
96. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1994)
(distinguishing between “revenue generation [which] is not a local interest that can justify
discrimination against interstate commerce” and legitimate local interests such as
“environmental cleanup costs,” which would be valid but “must be rejected absent the clearest
showing that the unobstructed flow of interstate commerce itself is unable to solve the local
problem”).
97. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under §
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). This endangerment finding
was made in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007), and it follows that such findings might be considered of some value to the courts in
appraising the value of local benefits produced.
98. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393.
99. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951).
100. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under §
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
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the type of benefits that their action will produce belong to a class
101
that is most favored by the Pike test.
B. Preemption
The absence of federal legislation—and the improbability of any
such legislation arriving in the foreseeable future—dramatically alters
this analysis. Instead, the focus should shift to the likelihood of
preemption by an administrative agency; namely, preemption arising
out of a potential conflict between state statutes and EPA’s
rulemaking under the Clean Air Act (CAA).
1. Federal Preemption. Preemption jurisprudence, which arises
102
out of the Supremacy Clause of Article IV of the Constitution,
concerns the outcome in instances where there is a potential overlap
between state and federal legislation. While, according to the plain
text of the Supremacy Clause, it is clear that state law is trumped
when it expressly conflicts with federal law, the facts are rarely so
straightforward. Congress can indicate preemptive intent either
103
through express language included in its legislation —so-called
104
“express preemption”—or through its “implied intent” —commonly
referred to as “field preemption.” This implied intent can be inferred
105
through the structure and purpose of Congress’s legislation, or,
more precisely, “if the scope of the statute indicates that Congress
intended federal law to occupy the legislative field, or if there is an
106
actual conflict between state and federal law.”
In such an analysis of “field preemption,” Congress’s purpose is
107
the “ultimate touchstone” of the decision; however, this is tempered
by the additional deference afforded to the states that “the historic

101. It also bears consideration that since the United Haulers decision in 2007, the
disposition of the court has not radically changed. Two of the Justices who joined that majority
opinion—Justices Stevens and Souter—have been replaced by two similarly-leaning Justices:
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.
102. The text of the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution is as follows:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.”
U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.
103. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995).
107. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
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police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal
108
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
This presumption in favor of state legislation is further bolstered
when Congress legislates in a field previously dominated by the
109
states.
Additionally, in the event that expressly preemptive
language in a federal statute is ambiguous, it is customary to interpret
in a manner that “disfavors preemption,” and, therefore, favors state
110
legislation.
2. Preemption by an Administrative Agency & the Clean Air Act.
Rules promulgated by EPA—not Congress—now present the most
likely source of possible preemption challenges to state legislation.
This is a new federalism question that will play an increasingly
important role for the future of subnational interstate initiatives that
will operate in an absence of clearly preemptive federal legislation.
Interestingly, although the jurisprudence is not as developed for
agency preemption as it is for federal preemption, it is clear that the
Supreme Court now recognizes an ever-growing deference to
111
administrative agency action.
Most recently, the Supreme Court decided in Geir v. American
112
Honda Motor Co. that a state law regarding airbags was preempted
by the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) implementation of
113
new airbag requirements. In making this decision, the Supreme
Court not only granted deference to DOT’s interpretation of the
114
statute, but also explicitly recognized that “regulations ‘intended to
pre-empt state law’ that are promulgated by an agency acting
nonarbitrarily and within its congressionally delegated authority may
115
also have pre-emptive force.” Further expanding the preemptive

108. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
109. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
110. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
111. This trend in the jurisprudence culminates with Geir v. American Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000), but it is clearly alluded to prior to that decision in Medtronic, 518 U.S. at
496 (“Because the FDA is the federal agency to which Congress has delegated its authority to
implement the provisions of the Act, the agency is uniquely qualified to determine whether a
particular form of state law [conflicts with the purpose and objectives of Congress] and,
therefore, whether it should be pre-empted.”) (citation omitted).
112. Geir, 529 U.S. at 861.
113. Id. at 874.
114. Id. at 883.
115. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-154 (1982) (“Where
Congress has directed to an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are subject to
judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted
arbitrarily.”).
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authority of administrative agencies, the Court recognized an implied
intent to preempt—in other words, field preemption—when it found
that agencies do not need to rely upon a “specific expression of
116
agency intent to pre-empt.” The implications of this deference to
agency preemption are enormous for state climate change regulation,
but the practical ramifications will depend entirely upon the attitude
that EPA assumes toward state and regional action.
3. A New Challenge to Federalism. For the time being, EPA has
not yet posed a preemption challenge to the nascent regional
initiatives. This may be due in part to the CAA’s generous savings
clause that allows states to impose regulatory standards of their own
117
so long as they are more stringent than the federal standards. Worth
further consideration is the fact that a savings clause—even one like
that contained within the CAA—does not entirely preclude such a
challenge, given that the Supreme Court also ruled in Geir that a
savings clause alone does not “foreclose” the possibility of implied
118
preemption.
Should EPA decide to challenge the legality of a state’s statute
that it adopted in accordance with its membership in a regional
initiative, the state may find some defense in an argument that
Congress did not in-fact delegate preemptive authority to EPA based
119
upon a reading of the CAA’s declaration of purpose.
This
declaration does not appear to mandate absolute authority to EPA,
but instead grants it the responsibility to “encourage and assist
development and operation of regional air pollution prevention and
120
control programs” and “to provide technical and financial assistance
121
to State and local governments.” Based upon the CAA’s text, EPA
is encouraged under its congressional grant of authority to assist, not
hinder, local initiatives or, in this case, regional initiatives and
collaborative state action.
This language may become critical for the regional initiatives
should a pre-emption challenge ever arise. Under such circumstances,
116. Id. at 885.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006) (“[N]othing in this Act shall preclude or deny the right of any
State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation
respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of
air pollution; . . . [so long as it is not] less stringent than the standard or limitation under such
plan or section.”).
118. Geir, 529 U.S. at 869.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006).
120. Id. § 7401(b)(4).
121. Id. § 7401(b)(3).
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the regional initiatives would be well-advised to point to this statutory
language to prove that Congress intended for EPA to augment state
or local action, not to preempt it. This will surely be a contested issue,
but only time will tell how EPA will choose to respond to the
initiatives and their regulatory policies.
V. CONCLUSION
In the absence of a comprehensive, nationwide federal
regulatory scheme to address climate change action, states have
stepped in to fill the void through coordinated action of their own.
These subnational efforts, although well-guided, face substantial
economic and constitutional difficulties. Much of the scholarship on
these regional initiatives operates on the assumption that federal
action is forthcoming. This Note consciously departs from that
position in its analysis of the viability of interstate climate action.
As this analysis shows, a pragmatic acceptance of current events
does not preclude an optimistic outlook for the continued success of
the regional initiatives. The regional initiatives are viable without
comprehensive federal legislation. Hopefully, this initial foray will
contribute to a shift in the academic discourse on subnational climate
action that will increasingly consider how the initiatives might expand
and accomplish nationwide greenhouse gas abatement through their
own means.

